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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES E. PITTS and ] 
ETHEL J. PITTS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v . • , 
LEO ROBERTS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14454 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff against de-
fendant, seeking a determination that a strip of land owned 
by defendant is a public thoroughfare and a declaration that 
defendant's land is subject to a prescriptive easement for 
plaintiffs' use. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Trial Court without 
a jury on June 10, 1975. Thereafter, the Trial Court made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
36-39), and Judgment (R. 34-35), in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiffs on both issues raised in plaintiffs' Com-
plaint. Plaintiffs appeal from the Trial Court's Judgment. 
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1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
• < 
Defendant-Respondent seeks to affirm the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment made and 
entered by the Trial Court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants improperly sets forth the facts in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs-Appellants, the losing 
parties in the Trial Court. The Utah Supreme Court repeat-
edly has held that the facts on appeal must be reviewed in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the court 
below. Furthermore, the Statement of Facts contained in the 
brief of plaintiffs contains so many inaccuracies and incon-
sistencies with the evidence produced at trial that it is 
essential that defendant set forth the following Statement of 
Facts as found by the Trial Court and supported by the evi-
dence. 
This action does not involve the right to use an 
alleyway which runs east and west between Emery Street and 
Concord Street as asserted in plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts. 
It involves only the right claimed by plaintiff's to use a 
strip of land along the south portion of defendant's residence 
property at 420 Emery Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The strip 
of land in question is approximately five to six feet wide and 
123.2 feet long (Tr. 110 and Exhibit 2-P). The action does 
involve the right of any parties to use the alleyway which 
extends west from the west boundary of defendant's property 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to Concord Street or the alley which extends north along the 
west boundary of plaintifffs property to 4th South Street (See 
Exhibit 2-P). It is essential that there be no confusion con-
cerning this point. 
The general area in question is depicted in the 
area of Exhibit 2-P which is surrounded by a red line. The 
plat indicates a 16-foot wide alleyway extending from Concord 
Street east to the west boundary of defendant's property. 
The alleyway then continues north at approximately the same 
width along the west boundary of defendant's property to 
4th South Street (Exhibit 2-P). The alleyway shown on the plat 
does not extend across defendant's property (Exhibit 2-P). 
The strip of land is question is an area about five to six 
feet wide along the south portion of defendant's property 
(Tr. 110 and Exhibit 2-P). The strip of land in question is 
referred to as a "walkway" (Exhibits 6-D and 12-D). 
The only testimony concerning the use of the walk-
way from 1920 until approximately 1954 was the testimony of 
a witness called by plaintiff, Mrs* Timothy, who has lived in 
a lot adjoining the alleyway to the west of defendant's pro-
perty since 1952 (Tr. 80). From 1920 until 1952 she lived in 
the surrounding area (Tr. 80). She testified that in 1920 
the alley was gravel and not paved. Concerning the use of 
the alley in 1920, she testified: 
I think most everybody they used it because 
the other was just vacant property and there 
hadn't been anything which they had, no rea-
son to go over that (Tr. 81). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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There was no testimony that anyone other than the adjoining 
i 
landowners used the alleyway at that time or that any per-
sons used the portion of defendant's property in question. 
There was no testimony as to the duration or frequency of 
the use. 
No one ever testified that a family named Potter 
operated a public garage between 1920 and 1936 for repairing 
and painting of cars, as asserted in plaintiff's brief. The 
plaintiffs' witness, Mrs. Timothy, testified that sometime 
prior to 1952 a Mr. Potter had "a big garage there, a big 
shop." Mr. Potter repaired and painted cars at the garage, 
but there was no testimony that he did it for the public or 
that any members of the public drove through the alley to 
the garage (Tr. 87). 
A second witness called by plaintiff, Holland David 
Lay, had lived in the area since September, 1936. In 1936 
there were only a few homes along the alley and the owners 
of those homes used the alley occasionally for delivery of 
coal and hay (Tr. 95). There was no testimony that any of 
those parties used the entire length of the alleyway or that 
they used the property in question to the south of defendant's 
property. There was no testimony as to how long they used 
the alley. Mr. Lay testified that he has used the alley but 
he never stated when he used it or whether he used the walk-
way in question. He testified that a number of years ago 
someone blocked the alleyway with a pole for a day or two 
and the blockade then disappeared (Tr. 96). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In 1546, plaintiffs purchased the house where they 
presently reside on Concord Street at the west end of the 
alleyway (Tr. 62 and Exhibit 2-P). In 1946 the alleyway was 
graveled (Tr. 63). Plaintiff Charles Edward Pitts testified 
only that he has driven into one end of the alley, backed 
into his yard and driven out the other end of the alley "for 
a long time" (Tr. 66). When he drove in the alleyway, he would 
drive an old 1951 Dodge pickup truck which sometimes was op-
erable (Tr. 66)e He did not state when or for how long he 
drove through the alleyway and he did not testify when or 
for how long he drove over the strip of defendant's property 
in question. 
There was a conflict in the evidence as to when 
the alleyway was first paved. Rolland David Lay testified 
that it was paved 12 or 13 years ago (Tr. 96). Mr. Lay test-
ified that the Salt Lake City Street Department installed the 
blacktop (Tr. 96-97). Other witnesses testified that the 
alley was blacktopped between 1952 and 1954 (Tr. 68 and 85). 
There was testimony that children who used to walk through 
the vacant property now walk through the alley (Tr. 85), but 
there was no testimony as to whether they have walked over 
the strip of land in question, or for how long or how frequently 
the children walked through the alley. 
Until December of 1952 there was a dedicated alley-
way running north and south between 4th South Street and the 
-5-
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4 
alleyway in question to the west of defendant's property (Ex-
hibit 2-P). An action was brought by the land owners in the i 
area in 1952 and the alleyway was vacated by the city of Salt 
Lake (Tr. 86 and Exhibit 7-D and 9-D) . Up until that time 
the alleyway running north and south was a dedicated public { 
road and apparently a continuation of the alleyway running 
west from the west boundary of defendant's property to Concord 
Street (Exhibit 2-P). ( 
Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts did not use the alley-
way daily, as asserted in plaintiff's brief, and there is 
no testimony that when he used the alleyway he used the strip 
of property belonging to defendant more than a few times (Tr, 
63 and 66). As to the times that he did use defendant's pro-
perty, he testified that he merely drove over that property 
"for a long time" (Tr. 66). According to his own testimony 
he only used the alleyway when he was driving his old 1951 
Dodge pickup truck and then only when the truck was operable 
(Tr. 66). In short, there was no testimony as to the length 
of the time he drove over the strip of land in question or 
the frequency of his use of the property. 
Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts testified that there were 
two apartments near the alley and the tenants may have used the 
alley aabout every day, but he does not know (Tr. 65). He test-
ified that other people who live along the alley used the alley 
to load garbage from their yards, but he never testified as to 
the frequency of their use or whether any of them used the 
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portion of defendant's property in question (Tr. 65). Rolland 
Lay testified that he sees cars using the alley every day but 
he does not know whose cars they are and he does not know 
if the cars go out Emery Street from the alley by way of the 
strip of property belonging to defendant (Tr, 98). He again 
did not testify as to the length of time he has seen the cars 
using the alley. 
The defendant moved into his present residence in 
June of 1971 (Tr. 109). He previously lived in the same area 
from 1961 to 1971. During that time he never observed any 
traffic in the walkway. At the time he moved into the house 
in 1971, the walkway was five or six feet wide (Tr. 110), and 
the alleyway extended west from his property to Concord Street 
and was eight feet wide (Tr. 115). Prom the time he moved 
into the house, he has continually blocked the alleyway with 
trash cans and with his car up to the south side of his pro-
perty line (Tr. 114 and 115). He has not allowed people to 
use the walkway since the time he moved into the house if he 
can help it (Tr. 110). The walkway in question along the south 
side of defendant's property is not wide enough for a car to 
drive over it and stay on the pavement (Tr. 115). 
With the property belonging to the defendant blocked, 
the owners of the other property in the area, including the 
plaintiffs, have the full use of the alleyway extending from 
Concord Street east to the west boundary of defendant's pro-
perty and they are not inhibited from using that dedicated 
alleyway (Tr. 118). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I i 
UNDER THE CARDINAL RULES OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED. ' 
By this appeal, the plaintiffs are attacking the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Trial Court 
which held that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that 
the strip of land in question is a public highway or public 
thoroughfare by reason of public use for more than 10 years 
and that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they 
have a prescriptive right to the use of the strip of land in 
question. 
The rules of appellate procedure in instances in 
which the appellant attacks the findings of the Trial Court 
are clearly set forth in Charlton v. Hackett 11 Ut. 2d 389, 
360 P.2d 176 (1961), in which the Court specified the follow-
ing "cardinal rules of review" concerning the Findings and 
Judgment of the Trial Court: 
(1) To indulge them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; 
(2) To require the appellant to sustain the burden 
of showing error; 
(3) To review the record in the light most favor-
able to them; 
(4) Not to disturb them if they find substantial 
support in the evidence. 
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Thus, all presumptions favor the findings and judg-
ment of the Trial Court and the party attacking those findings 
and judgment has the burden of showing that they are in error 
and should be overturned. As to the review of the record, 
plaintiffs-appellants recite the evidence most favorable to 
their contentions to the exclusion of other evidence favor-
able to defendants, in addition to dlearly misstating the facts 
produced in evidence, which is not permissable on appellate 
review. Thomson v. Condas 27 Ut. 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). 
Of equal and vital importance is the rule of appel-
late review governing the refusal of the Trial Court to make 
findings essential to the appellant's right to recover. The 
rule is well-stated in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and 
Reed Co. 27 Ut. 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132, (1971), which held as 
follows: 
Where the appellant's position is that the 
trial court erred in refusing to make 
certain findings essential to its right to 
recover, and insists that the evidence com-
pels such findings, it is obligated to show 
that there is credible and uncontradicted 
evidence which proves those contended facts 
with such certainty that all reasonable minds 
must so find. Conversely, if there is any 
reasonable basis, either in the evidence or 
from the lack of evidence upon which reason-
able minds might conclude that they are not 
so convinced by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, then the findings should not be over-
turned . [Emphasis added]. 
Thus, the evidence presented at trial as summarized 
in the foregoing statement of facts makes it clear that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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findings of the Trial Court are supported by the evidence in 
the record. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of 
proving that there is credible and uncontradicted evidence 
which proves their allegations with such certainty that all 
reasonable minds must so find and further that there is no 
reasonable basis, either in the evidence or from the lack 
of evidence, upon which reasonable minds might conclude that 
they are not so convinced by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Therefore, the findings of the Trial Court should not be dis-
turbed and the judgment must be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THEY ACQUIRED A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT FOR 
THE USE OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
Defendant has no quarrel with plaintiff's statement 
of law regarding prescriptive easement as set forth in 4 Tif-
fany Real Property (3rd Edition), § 1191, P. 960, in which 
it is stated that, 
To acquire easement over land by prescrip-
tion, it is necessary to show use: 
1. Adverse to the owner. 
2. Under a claim of right. 
3. Open. 
4. Notorious. 
5. Continuous. 
6. Uninterrupted. 
7. For the period of prescription. 
Defendant also has no argument with plaintiff's contention 
that the period of prescription in Utah is 20 years. See 
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Anderson v. Osguthorpe 29 Ut. 2d 32, 504 P.2d 1000 (1972). 
The serious error in plaintiff's arguments is that 
plaintiffs totally misstate the facts produced in evidence, 
state the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 
and ignore the rules of appellate review set forth above. 
Neither of the plaintiffs ever testified that they 
used the alleyway openly and continuously since 1946, as asser-
ted in plaintiff's brief. The substance of the testimony of 
plaintiff Charles E. Pitts is set forth in the foregoing 
statement of facts. Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts stated that 
he used the alleyway on occasion for "a long time" (Tr. 66). 
At the times when he used the alley, he only used it when 
his old 1951 Dodge pickup truck was operable and he never 
stated for how long the truck was operable or at what time 
the truck was operable (Tr. 66). When the truck was operable, 
there is no indication from his testimony that he drove the 
truck over defendant's property other than once or twice. In 
short, there is no evidence even in the statements by plain-
tiff Charles E. Pitts that he used defendant's property "openly 
and continuously since 1946." Additionally, the alleyway 
was blocked sometime before defendant obtained the property 
in 1971 (Tr. 96), and defendant continually blocked the en-
trance to the strip of property owned by defendant after he 
purchased the property in 1971 (Tr. 110, 114, and 115). 
Plaintiffs then argue in Point I of their brief 
that the claim of right by plaintiff Charles E. Pitts to use 
defendant's property was that it was "apparently and obviously" 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
a gravel passageway open to use by the general public. This 
argument is totally inconsistent with the plaintiff's argument 
that plaintiff Charles E. Pitts obtained a prescriptive ease-
ment for use of the property. If plaintiff were able to es-
tablish that plaintiff used the alleyway in common with the 
general public, this would not constitute use adverse to the 
owner of the property for purposes of obtaining a prescriptive 
easement. 
In the case of Chournos v. Alkema/ 27 Ut. 2d 244/ 494 
P.2d 950 (1972), the court held that a use by the plaintiff 
in common with members of the general public is not sufficient 
to establish a prescriptive easement for use of the property. 
The Court reasoned as follows: 
The trial court erred insofar as it found-
a prescriptive right in defendants based 
upon public use. A prescriptive right was 
originally based upon the theory of a grant 
implied from long user, and it runs to the 
individual and not to the public. One can-
not claim a right of way as a private one 
by showing it has been used by the public. 
He must show user by himself or his pre-
dessors of the way to his own lot. 
While a public road may be so 
established, the use by indiv-
idual persons in common with 
the public generally is regarded 
as permissive, and by such common 
use no individual person can 
acquire a right by prescription 
as against the owner of the fee 
... [cites Thornley Land and 
Livestock Company v. Morgan Bro-
thers Land and Livestock Company, 
81 Ut. 317, 17 P.2d 826-27 (1932)]. 
[Emphasis supplied by the Court]. 
— i n— 
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Thus, even if plaintiff Charles E. Pitts could es-
tablish that he used the property owned by defendant for the 
period of prescription in the same manner as the "general 
public," he would clearly not have established a prescriptive 
easement for use of the property. 
Plaintiffs then argue that "uncontroverted testimony 
of two witnesses establishes the paving of the alleyway between 
1950 and 1954. To the contrary, one of the plaintiffs' own 
witnesses testified thatthe alley was paved 12 or 13 years ago 
(Tr. 96). Even if the alleyway were paved in 1954 and the alley-
way were used by plaintiff Charles E. Pitts continually there-
after, there would not be 20 years of uninterrupted use by plain-
tiff, since defendant continually blocked the alleyway begin-
ning in 1971. There is no testimony as to why the city paved 
the portion of defendant's property when it did, but certainly 
no implication can be drawn from the mere fact that someone 
from the city may have installed paving material on a portion 
of defendant's property, particularly when defendant prevented 
people from entering the property. 
There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff used 
the property in question adversely to the owner, under a claim 
of right, openly, notoriously, continuously, without inter-
ruption, for the period of prescription. Therefore, neither 
of plaintiffs has met the requirements of proving a prescrip-
tive easement, for 20 years or any other period. 
-13-
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Thus, plaintiffs have failed to show that there is 
credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves the facts 
contended by plaintiff with such certainty that all reasonable 
minds must so find and that there is no reasonable basis, either 
in the evidence or from the lack of evidence, upon which reason-
able minds might conclude that they are not so convinced by a 
preponderance of the evidence• On this basis, the finding 
of the Trial Court that the plaintiffs failed to establish 
a prescriptive easement in the property in question is clearly 
supported by the evidence and the Trial Court's judgment based 
upon the findings must be upheld. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION BECAME A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE BY 
PUBLIC USE FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS. 
As noted in the argument under Point II, above, 
plaintiffs are making the totally inconsistent claims that, 
on the one hand, plaintiffs have established a prescriptive 
easement for use of the property in question and, on the other 
hand, that defendant's property has impliedly been dedicated 
to the public by defendant and defendant's predessors under 
section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The inconsis-
tency between these claims is pointed out in Chournos v. Al-
kema, Supra. 
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Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
as follows: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of 
the public when it has been continuously 
used as a public thoroughfare for a per-
iod of 10 years. 
Under this statute, an owner of property may impliedly 
dedicate his property to public use as a public thoroughfare 
if he allows the public to use the property for the prescribed 
period under circumstances which would indicate that he intended 
to dedicate his property to the use of the public in general. 
The rule is well stated in Morris v. Blunt, 49 Ut. 243, 161 
P.2d 1127, 1130, as follows: 
A dedication rests primarily on the intent 
of the owner. There must be a concession 
intentionally made by him, which may be proved 
by declarations or by acts, or may be infer-
red from the circumstances. No form or cere-
mony is necessary. It must, however, appear 
that he knew of the use by the public, and 
intended to grant the right of way to the 
public. [Emphasis added] 
Inasmuch as a finding by the court that the owner of 
property has impliedly dedicated his property to the public 
would constitute an appropriation of the individual's property 
by the state, such a dedication is not taken lightly and all 
presumptions are in favor of the property owner. The rule is 
stated in Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Ut. 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 
648, as follows: 
In connection with this review we deem it 
appropriate to note our agreement that the 
dedication of one's property to a public 
use should not be regarded lightly and that 
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certain principals should be adhered to. 
The presumption is in favor of the property 
owner; and the burden of establishing public 
use for the required period of time is on 
those claiming it. The mere fact that mem-
bers of the public may use a private drive-
way or alley without interference will not 
necessarily establish it as a public way; 
nor will the fact that it was shown on the 
public records to be a public street, nor 
even that it had been paved and sign posted 
as a public street by the city. [Emphasis 
added] 
Thus, all presumptions are in favor of the property 
owner and a great burden of proof is placed upon the person 
claiming that the land has been dedicated to a public use. To 
hold otherwise would be to allow a taking of private property 
for public use without just compensation to the owner. See 
Justice Callister's dissent in Bonner v. Sudbury, Supra. 
Also, the rule is clear in Utah that evidence of use 
of a roadway by the owners of property adjacent to the road 
does not constitute a use by the public for purposes of implied 
dedication of the roadway. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Ut. 2d 376, 
438 P.2d 545 (1968). 
There was no evidence produced at trial that the 
portion of defendant's property in question was used continu-
ously as a public thoroughfare by the general public for a per-
iod of 10 years. No one testified that the defendant's pro-
perty or any portion of the alleyway was used for "general 
vehicular traffic," as was argued in plaintiff's brief. Plain-
tiff Charles E. Pitts only observed use of the alleyway by 
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tenants in an apartment house adjacent to the alley, owners of 
homes adjacent to the alley, and children who played in the 
alley (Tr. 65, 70, and 75). Plaintifffs witness, Mrs. Timothy, 
testified only as to use of the alley by persons who owned 
property adjacent to the alley, tenants in the apartment house 
adjacent to the alley, and children who played and walked in 
the alley (Tr. 81-87). She did not testify as to whether de-
fendant's property was used by those parties. 
Plaintiff's other witness, Rolland David Lay, has 
seen cars using the alley every day, but he does not know who 
owned those vehicles (Tr. 98), and he apparently does not know 
whether they are members of the general public. He did not 
testify as to the duration of the use. Furthermore, he does 
not know if those cars drive out Emery Street at the other end 
of the alley (Tr. 98), and he thus does not know whether any 
of those cars have ever driven onto defendant's property. Ac-
cording to his understanding, those cars may well have driven 
to the apartment house adjacent to the alley and then have 
driven out the same way they came in without crossing defen-
dant's property (Tr. 98). 
None of the testimony by the witnesses produced 
by plaintiffs specified the dates of use or the frequency of 
use by any of the persons who use the alley in question, other 
than the use by some adjacent property owners. There is no 
testimony that the alley was ever used by the public for en-
trance to a garage and repair shop, as asserted by plaintiffs. 
In short, there was no testimony produced at trial as to use of 
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defendant's property by the general public or as to the fre-
quency of use or the periods of time the alley was used. 
In contending that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to find that the plaintiffs established a public use of 
the road for a period of 10 years, the plaintiffs must first 
prove that the defendant intentionally dedicated the strip 
of land in question to the use of the public when all pre-
sumptions favor the retention of the property by the land 
owner. Bonner v. Sudbury, Supra. Since the Trial Court found 
the issues in favor of the defendant and against the plain-
tiffs, all facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
defendant, and the plaintiffs have the burden of showing error. 
The court will indulae the Trial Court's findings with a pre-
sumption of validity and correctness. In order to disturb the 
findings of the Trial Court, the plaintiffs must show that 
there is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves 
the plaintiffs' contentions with such certainty that all rea-
sonable minds must so find and that there is no reasonable 
basis, either in the evidence or from the lack of evidence 
upon which reasonable minds might conclude that the^ are not 
so convinced by a preponderance of the evidence. First Western 
Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., Supra. In view of the facts 
and authorities set forth above, the plaintiffs have clearly 
failed to meet their burden on appeal and the findings and 
judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY 
SUPPORT THE COURTfS JUDGMENT. 
In paragraph 6 of the Trial Court's findings of 
fact, the Trial Court found that the evidence presented by 
the plaintiff was absolutely lacking as to any evidence of 
necessity for use of defendant's property by plaintiffs. This 
finding was entered by the Trial Court, inasmuch as it was 
not entirely clear whether plaintiffs were claiming easement 
by implication in addition to plaintiff's claims of easement 
by prescription and dedication by public use (See plaintiff's 
Complaint at Rl-2). Even if the Trial Court had considered 
necessity to be an element of prescriptive easement or dedi-
cation by public use, however, this would not be relevant to 
plaintiff's appeal, in that the remaining findings by the 
Trial Court clearly support the Trial Court's conclusions of 
law and judgment (R. 34-39). 
The rule is well established in Utah that a Trial 
Court's iudoment should be affirmed if the court reached the 
correct results even if he did not give the correct reason 
for his ruling. Foss Lewis and Sons Construction Co. v. Gen-
eral Insurance Co. of America, 30 Ut. 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 
(1973). In the present case, the Trial Court merely added 
one finding in addition to the findings which clearly supported 
the Trial Court's conclusion and judgment. The additional 
finding in no way detracts from the other findings of fact. 
Therefore, whether the plaintiffs did or did not claim an 
easement by implication is irrelevant, in that- fho ^ ^ i r»~~~*- • -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment is clearly supported by the findings of the Trial 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court madeand entered Findings of Fact 
favorable to defendant. The strona oresumption of the cor-
rectness and validity of the findings has not been overcome 
by plaintiffs, nor have plaintiffs demonstrated that there 
is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves plain-
tiff 's contentions with such certainty that all reasonable 
minds must so find and further that there is no reasonable 
basis, either in the evidence or from the lack of evidence 
upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they are not so 
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, 
the Trial Court's findings should not be disturbed and the 
Trial Court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Under the facts, cases and statutes set forth above, 
defendant respectfully submits that the findinqs of the Trial 
Court are supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden on appeal, and 
the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
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